prisoner's dilemma
111Matching pennies — This article is about the two person game. For the confidence trick, see coin matching game. Heads Tails Heads +1, −1 −1, +1 …
112Common knowledge (logic) — For common knowledge in general, see Common knowledge. Common knowledge is a special kind of knowledge for a group of agents. There is common knowledge of p in a group of agents G when all the agents in G know p, they all know that they know p,… …
113Cournot competition — is an economic model used to describe an industry structure in which companies compete on the amount of output they will produce, which they decide on independently of each other and at the same time. It is named after Antoine Augustin Cournot[1] …
114Grim trigger — (also called the grim strategy or just grim) is a trigger strategy in game theory for a repeated game, such as an iterated prisoner s dilemma. Initially, a player using grim trigger will cooperate, but as soon as the opponent defects (thus… …
115Dynamic inconsistency — In economics, dynamic inconsistency, or time inconsistency, describes a situation where a decision maker s preferences change over time in such a way that what is preferred at one point in time is inconsistent with what is preferred at another… …
116Dictator game — The dictator game is a game in experimental economics, similar to the ultimatum game. Experimental results offer evidence against the rationally self interested individual (sometimes called the homo economicus) concept of economic behavior,[1]… …
117Stackelberg competition — The Stackelberg leadership model is a strategic game in economics in which the leader firm moves first and then the follower firms move sequentially. It is named after the German economist Heinrich Freiherr von Stackelberg who published Market… …
118Escalation of commitment — was first described by Barry M. Staw in his 1976 paper, Knee deep in the big muddy: A study of escalating commitment to a chosen course of action .[1] More recently the term sunk cost fallacy has been used to describe the phenomenon where people… …
119Non-credible threat — Illustration that shows the difference between a SPNE and a other NE. The blue equilibrium is not subgame perfect because player two makes a non credible threat at 2(2) to be unkind (U). A non credible threat is a term used in game theory and… …
120Complete mixing — In evolutionary game theory, complete mixing refers to an assumption about the type of interactions that occur between individual organisms. Interactions between individuals in a population attains complete mixing if and only if the probably… …
